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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHERINE KOULIS (GORAS), 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF 
CALIFORNIA, WESTERN OPERATIONS, 
INC.; CHEVRON USA, INC.; 
CHEVRON OIL COMPANY dba 
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF 
CALIFORNIA, 
Defendant-Respondents 
STATEMENT OF ISSUESx 
With all due respect to appellant, respondents contend 
the issues herein are as follows: 
1. Was summary judgment properly based upon the 
Statute of Limitations where appellant alleged fraud which 
occurred in 1968 and failed to provide a legally cognizable 
excuse for not filing suit until 1983. 
2. Was summary judgment properly based upon the 
Statute of Limitations where appellant's alleged breach of 
"""Respondents are all affiliated companies. For ease 
of discussion herein, they will be collectively referred to as 
"respondent." 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
Case No. 20205 
Lease which occurred in 1968 and failed to file suit until 1983 
and failed to provide a legally cognizable reason for such 
failure. 
It is respectfully submitted that those issues 
denominated "2" and "4" as set forth in appellant's brief are 
not issues herein. With respect to appellant's denominated 
issue "2", as will be explained hereinafter, the "alleged 
breach" is irrelevant to this appeal and the ruling of the 
court below. The issue herein is not whether respondents 
"breached," but rather was the lawsuit instituted seasonably. 
With respect to issue number 4, for purposes of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment the respondent conceded that 
appellant did not actually discover the alleged delicts until 
a date within three years of the filing of the complaint. It 
is contended however, that the determinative date is not, under 
Utah law, the date of actual discovery, but rather the date 
when appellant should reasonably have known of the facts 
constituting the fraud. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant filed her original complaint on August 26, 
1983. Appellant alleged generally that respondent breached the 
lease and its modification by failing to construct a service 
station completely on the property of appellant; instead, 
appellant alleged, such service station was constructed 
partially on appellant's property and partially on adjacent 
property belonging to a third party. 
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Subsequently, after respondent answered the complaint, 
appellant with leave of Court filed an amended complaint. In 
the amended complaint, sounding in both breach of lease and 
fraud in the inducement, appellant again alleged that the 
service station so constructed was not completely on 
appellant's property. It was also alleged that respondent 
concealed its fraud from appellant. 
On June 26, 1984 respondent filed its Motion for 
Summary Judgment based upon the Statute of Limitations, as 
contained in U.C.A. §§ 78-12-23(2) and 78-12-26(3). Upon 
hearing, the trial court, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, 
judge presiding, did grant respondent's motion and issued its 
order thereon on August 22, 1984. (A true and correct copy of 
said order is attached hereto as Exhibit A.) This appeal is 
taken from that order. Both parties have sought summary 
disposition of this appeal before this Supreme Court. Such 
summary disposition has been denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
The "facts" of this case are not complex. The 
"Respondent objects to appellant's statement of 
facts as contained in appellant's brief in pages 2 through 6. 
The "Appellants Facts" are totally violative of Rule 75(p)(2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in that such "facts" 
contain no citations to the record. The "facts" are nothing 
more than argument and legal conclusions proferred by counsel 
for appellant. It is respectfully suggested that for such a 
purposeful violation of this Court's rules that the entirety of 
the appellant's brief be stricken. 
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position of respondent in the court below was that when 
appellant failed to file suit until fifteen years after the 
alleged delicts, respondent was entitled to judgment based upon 
the applicable statutes of limitation. In support of 
respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment in the trial court, 
respondent proferred the following facts which were not 
reasonably subject to dispute: 
1. On August 2, 1958 respondent, as lessee, entered 
into a lease agreement (the "1958 Lease") with Pauline Koulis 
(appellant's predecessor in interest), as lessor, concerning 
the following-described premises (hereinafter referred to as 
the "Koulis Property") in the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah: 
Commencing at the Southwest Corner of Lot 4, 
Block 63, Plat C, Salt Lake City Survey, and 
running thence East 132.75 feet; thence North 
74.75 feet; thence West 123.75 feet; thence South 
74.75 feet, to the point of beginning. 
The common address for the Koulis Property is Eighth West and 
North Temple in Salt Lake City. A true and correct copy of 
said 1958 Lease is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and is hereby 
incorporated by reference. See also plaintiff-appellant's 
Amended Complaint, U 1; defendant-respondent's Answer to 
Amended Complaint, 11 1; defendant-respondent' s Exhibit 9 to the 
Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984. 
2. Respondent was unable to take possession of the 
leased property because appellant's predecessor had leased the 
same premises to a third party whose lease did not terminate 
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until 1967. Prior to the time of respondents possession, the 
property had on it a two story building. The bottom floor 
housed a drug store and the top floor was used as a residence 
for the Koulis family. Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated 
January 10, 1984, p. 10, 17. 
3. On or about May 16, 1967 Pauline Koulis entered 
into a Modification of Lease (the "1967 Modification") with 
respondent. A true and correct copy of said 1967 Modification 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and is hereby incorporated by 
reference. See also plaintiff-appellant's Amended Complaint, 
H 1; defendant - respondentf s Answer to Amended Complaint, 11 1; 
defendant-respondent *s Exhibit 10 to the Deposition of 
Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984. 
4. Pauline Koulis was the predecessor in interest of 
appellant regarding the above 1958 Lease and 1967 Modification 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Lease"), and all 
of Pauline Koulis1 right, title, and interest of every type and 
nature in the Lease was distributed to, and vested in the name 
of appellant. See Amended Complaint, 11 2; Deposition of 
Katherine Koulis dated January 10, 1984, Exhibits 2, 3, 4. 
Appellant and her now deceased husband (a predecessor in 
interest) received payments from respondent from 1968 until at 
least 1982 under the Lease. Deposition of Katherine Koulis 
dated June 15, 1984, pp. 58-59. 
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5. In 1958 appellant was aware that her mother-in-
law, Pauline Koulis, entered into the Lease with respondent for 
the utilization of the above-described property as a Chevron 
service station (hereinafter the "Chevron Station" or 
"Station"). Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated January 10, 
1984, p. 11. Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 
1984, p. 57. 
6. Appellant lived in an apartment on the Koulis 
Property, the property on which the Chevron Station now rests, 
from the 1950's until April, 1967. Deposition of Katherine 
Koulis dated January 10, 1984, pp. 9-11. Deposition of 
Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, p. 65. 
7. In 1967 appellant moved from the Koulis Property 
because the Chevron Station was being built on the Koulis 
Property by respondent. Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated 
January 10, 1984, pp. 10, 19. 
8. Pauline Koulis died on or about January 20, 1968, 
in Salt Lake City. See Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated 
January 10, 1984, p. 15; "Approval of First and Final Account, 
Decree of Distribution and Discharge of Executors," dated July 
10, 1968, p. 1, attached hereto at Exhibit "D" and also 
appearing as respondent's Exhibit 8 to the deposition of 
Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984. 
9. Appellant was generally aware from 1967 through 
1982 of the Lease between Pauline Koulis and the respondent. 
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Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated Ji it le ] 5 , 1 984, pp 45, 
47-48. 
10. Appellant was the executrix of the Estate of 
Pauline Koulis in 1968 and was fully aware, as executrix, that 
one of the assets of the estate was the Lease, and that 
respondent, as lessee, paid approximately $350.00 per month as 
rent for the Koulis Property. Deposition of Katherine Koulis 
dated January 10, 1984, p. 35; Deposition of Katherine Koulis 
dated June 15, 1984, pp. 49-51. See also "Approval of First 
and Final Account, Decree and Distribution and Discharge of 
Debtors, dated July 10, 1968, pp. 1, 3-4, which is 
defendant-respondentfs Exhibit No. 8 to the Deposition of 
Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, and which is also 
attached hereto as Exhibit "D." 
11. In 1968 the appellant and her husband, as 
executrix and executor of the estate of Pauline Koulis, read 
the "Approval of First and Final Account, Decree and 
Distribution and Discharge of Debtors," dated July 10, 1968, 
which document recited that (1) one of the assets of the estate 
of Pauline Koulis was the Lease; (2) that the specific property 
description of the Koulis Property on which the Chevron Station 
now sits was subject to the Lease; and (3) that the monthly 
payments would be $350.00 per month. See Deposition of 
Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, pp. 52, 55. See also 
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"Approval of First and Final Account, Decree and Distribution 
and Discharge of Debtors, pp. 1-3, which is respondent's 
Exhibit 8 to the Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 
1984, and which is also attached hereto in Exhibit "D." The 
said "Approval of First and Final Account" was filed at the 
request of the appellant. Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated 
June 15, 1984, p. 10. 
12. After leaving the Koulis Property, appellant 
remained in Salt Lake City, residing at 2370 Bryan Avenue, Salt 
Lake City, Utah until May of 1981. Deposition of Katherine 
Koulis dated June 15, 1984, pp. 4-5. The time to drive from 
appellant's Bryan address to the Koulis Property was 
approximately 15-20 minutes. Deposition of Katherine Koulis 
dated June 15, 1984, p. 4. 
13. The Chevron Station was fully erected and 
completed sometime in 1968. Deposition of Katherine Koulis 
dated January 10, 1984, p. 28. 
14. Appellant, as executrix of the estate of Pauline 
Koulis, did not attempt to obtain a copy of the 1958 Lease and 
1967 Modification described above. Furthermore, appellant 
stated that there was no reason why she did not obtain a copy, 
and that she never obtained a copy of said Lease as executrix 
of Pauline Koulis' estate because it "[n]ever occurred to me at 
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the time." Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated January 10, 
1984, p. 35. 
15. Appellant saw the completed Chevron Station on 
the Koulis Property at least once in 1968 Deposition of 
Katherine Koulis dated January 10, 1984, p. 28. Appellant has 
also generally admitted that she saw the Chevron Station after 
it was "totally complete." Id. at 16. Appellant stated she 
passed the Koulis Property whenever she needed to go to Magna 
or Saltair. Id. at 27. 
16. Prior to and after 1967-1968, appellant was aware 
of the boundary line between the Koulis Property and the 
adjacent property to the north, the "Crowther Property." 
Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, pp. 63-70; 
Exhibit 6A to Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated January 10, 
1984. 
17. The Chevron Station was built on both the Koulis 
Property and the adjoining Crowther Property. Id. at pp. 
73-74. As indicated in the Affidavit of James W. Stewart, 
dated June 25, 1984, and the certified warranty deed attached 
to said Affidavit, the Crowther Property was deeded in 1967 to 
Diana Amelia Child Martin. As further indicated in: (1) said 
Affidavit and Exhibit 1 thereto; (2) the Affidavit of Rick 
Gates dated June 25, 1984 and Exhibit 2 thereto; and (3) the 
Affidavit of R. Lynn Peterson dated June 25, 1984 and Exhibits 
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thereto, the boundaries of the Crowther Property were identical 
to the property now owned by Diana Amelia Child Martin. 
18. The Crowther Property, now owned by Diana Amelia 
Child Martin, during the period that appellant lived on the 
Koulis Property, consisted of a single family residence. This 
residence was razed and the ground subsequently paved to 
accommodate the Chevron Station built by respondent. 
Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, p. 66. 
19. The buildings comprising the Chevron Station are 
located partially on the Koulis Property and also extend 
approximately 24 feet onto the Crowther-Martin Property. 
Twenty-four feet is approximately one-half of the width of the 
3 
Crowther-Martin Property . Affidavit of R. Lynn Peterson 
(Surveyor) dated June 25, 1984; See Title Report and Affidavit 
of Rick Gates dated June 25, 1984, indicating appellant has a 
common property line with Diana Martin. 
20. Appellant was aware in 1968 when she saw the 
completed Chevron Station that the Crowther home was no longer 
there. Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, p. 
66. 
21. In 1967 and 1968, approximately one-half of the 
Chevron Station was built on the Koulis Property described in 
The Crowther-Martin Property is rectangular in 
shape. It is 74.75 feet long and 49 feet wide. Affidavits of 
Lynn Peterson and Rick Gates. 
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the Lease. At the same time approximately the other one-half 
of the Chevron Station was built on the Crowther Property (now 
Martin Property.) See Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated 
January 10, 1984, Exhibit 1; Affidavit of R. Lynn Peterson 
(Surveyor) dated June 25, 1984; See also Affidavit of Phyllis 
Vetter dated June 26, 1984 and Certified Copy of plat map, 
attached thereto as Exhibit 1. 
22. When appellant finally decided to ask respondent 
to provide her with another copy of the Lease in 1982, the 
respondent did so. Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated 
January 10, 1984, p. 32. 
23. Appellant did not notify respondent until on or 
about January 4, 1983 of the alleged "breach" of the Lease, 
i.e. that the Chevron Station was not built completely on the 
Koulis Property in 1968 as allegedly specified in the Lease. 
See "Notice of Breach of Lease," dated January 4, 1983, 
attached hereto as Exhibit "E." The alleged breach occurred in 
1968, i.e. when construction on the Chevron Station was 
completed. Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated January 10, 
1984, p. 28. Appellant did not bring an action based upon the 
alleged breach until approximately August 26, 1983. See 
Complaint, p. 6. Thus, this action was brought approximately 
15 years after the alleged breach. 
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These facts were the facts upon which respondent 
contended that appellant unreasonably delayed in the bringing 
of this action. Recognizing the rule that a summary judgment 
is improper if there is a genuine issue of fact yet to be 
determined, respondent cannot ignore that portion of 
appellant's brief denominated "Appellants Facts." 
As has been previously pointed out there is no 
citation to the record referred to by appellant. Secondly, 
most of the assertions are conclusions of law, not facts, and 
are unsupported in this tribunal and were not supported by 
factual averment in the court below. 
Lastly, most of the statements are irrelevant. In her 
brief appellant continues to urge that when paragraphs 7 and 11 
of the 1958 Lease are read together it is clear paragraph 7 is 
void. Further, it is argued that respondent's failure to build 
the Chevron Station solely upon appellant's property destroyed 
the mutuality of the Lease. Again, it must be pointed out that 
this case, in the present posture, does not deal with the 
merits of appellant's lawsuit. This appeal is solely concerned 
with the fifteen year delay in filing suit. Under these 
circumstances, whether paragraph 7 of the Lease is void, or 
whether the Lease lacks mutuality, does not aid this Court is 
resolving the issues at bar. 
Additionally, whether respondent: breached the Lease or 
whether respondent was guilty of fraud are not at issue 
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herein. The sole question to be determined is whether the 
lower Court was correct when it found: 
ff
. . . that the Plaintiff had the opportunity of 
knowing the facts constituting the alleged fraud and 
was thereafter inactive and dilatory in commencing her 
action. The Court finds that all of the facts 
necessary for Plaintiff to have discovered the alleged 
fraud and commenced this action were available to her 
in 1968. The Court further finds that Plaintiff has 
failed to come forward with any legally cognizable 
reason to excuse her delayed discovery of the alleged 
fraud.'1 Exhibit A attached hereto. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Respondent contends that there are two issues to be 
determined herein: 
1. Whether the trial court was correct in determining 
that the statute of limitations as contained in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-23(2) barred appellant's cause of action for breach of 
contract, and 
2. Whether appellant's cause of action for fraud was 
barred based on the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) 
requiring a fraud action to be instituted within three years of 
when discovery of the facts constituting the action should 
reasonably have been discovered. 
It is respondent's position that the trial court was 
correct in granting summary judgment against the appellant. 
The facts as presented in the Court below conclusively 
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established that all of the facts that would put a reasonably-
prudent person of ordinary intelligence on notice of possible 
fraud were apparent in 1968. Appellant, however, through her 
own inattention did not institute her action until 1983. Thus, 
fifteen years elapsed between the time she should have been 
aware of her cause, and the time she filed suit. Under the 
existing law of this state, her claims are now barred. 
ARGUMENT 
1. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER, BASED UPON THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, WHERE APPELLANT FAILED TO 
INSTITUTE SUIT UNTIL FIFTEEN YEARS AFTER THE 
ALLEGED BREACH OF LEASE 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-23(2) provides that the 
statute of limitations for an action based upon an instrument 
in writing is six years. Once it was established that the 
alleged breach occurred in 1968 (the date the Chevron Station 
was completed) it was clear that the cause of action for breach 
of lease was barred. 
The applicable case law establishes that appellant's 
cause of action for the alleged breach of the Lease accrued at 
the time that the alleged breach occurred. M. H. Walker 
Realty Co. v. American Surety Company of New York, 211 P. 998, 
1008 (Utah 1922) ("These cases undoubtedly support the 
contention that in an action to recover for the breach of a 
contract the statute ordinarily begins to run when the breach 
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occurs and not when the damage is ascertained"). See also 
Shipp v. O'Dowd, 454 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (cause 
of action for breach of contract arises when the breach 
occurs). Stated differently and in general terms, a 
plaintiff's cause of action accrues "at the time it becomes 
remediable in the courts," O'Hair v. Kounalis, 23 Utah 2d 355, 
463 P.2d 799, 800 (1970), or "upon the happening of the last 
event necessary to complete the cause of action." Myers v. 
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). 
Under any of the formulations of the Utah Supreme 
Court quoted above, appellant's cause of action for the alleged 
breach of the Lease must have arisen no later than 1968, the 
year that the Chevron Station was completed. Any breach of the 
Lease based upon the fact that the Chevron Station was not 
constructed entirely upon the Koulis Property could not have 
occurred at any time beyond 1968, for appellant admits that the 
Chevron Station was entirely completed in 1968. Deposition of 
Katherine Koulis dated January 10, 1984, p.28. Consequently, 
appellant's failure to bring her action within six years from 
the date on which the Chevron Station was completed renders her 
claim time-barred under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-23(2). The Chevron Station was fully constructed by 
1968. Therefore, appellant's cause of action for breach of the 
Lease ran in 1974, and is now barred. 
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Even if it were assumed, arguendo, that an exception 
does exist in the law of this state for "fraudulent 
concealment" of a breach of lease, appellant failed to come 
forward with any facts in the tribunal below which support such 
a contention. There are but two contentions by appellant 
concerning "concealment." 
The first contention is that respondent failed to tell 
either appellant or her predecessors that the Chevron Station 
was being built on two parcels of land. This failure would 
have occurred in 1967 or 1968. The second contention is that 
when respondent recorded the Martin lease in 1968 it only 
recorded a "skeleton" lease thus making it more difficult for 
appellant to learn of the Martin interest in the service 
station. As found by the court below, neither of these "facts" 
could possibly relieve appellant of her duty of reasonable 
inquiry. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has held in some 
instances that a plaintiff's proof of concealment or misleading 
by the defendant constitutes an exception to the general bar of 
the Statute of Limitations and precludes the defendant from 
relying on the limitations argument (Myers v. McDonald, 635 
P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)), appellant's mere allegation that she 
was ignorant of her claim until October, 1982 is insufficient 
under the law to toll the applicable statute of limitations. 
Amundson v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association, 13 
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Utah 2d 407, 375 P.2d 463 (1962) (holding that plaintifffs 
claim for insurance death benefits which was not made until 
thirty-three years after the death of the insured was barred by 
§ 78-12-23, regardless of plaintiff's allegation that she was 
not aware that the policy existed and that she was a 
beneficiary under the policy.) Once the respondent proved, 
prima facie, a statute of limitations defense, appellant, in 
the court below, was required to sustain the burden of showing 
that a genuine triable issue of fact existed with respect to 
the statute of limitations. Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines 
Development Company, 72 U. 137, 269 P. 147 (holding that if a 
defendant foreign corporation sets up in its answer that 
plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations, 
plaintiff must in his reply state facts and circumstances 
sufficient to toll the statute.) Importantly, the appellant 
states in her deposition that the only circumstance she alleges 
was fraudulantly concealed from her or her predecessors in 
interest, was that the Chevron Station was built partly on the 
property of another. Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated June 
15, 1984, pp. 38-40. Appellant has admitted she was unaware of 
what the respondent did to conceal this fact. Id. at 43. 
It is not surprising that appellant has failed to 
plead or discuss her argument of fraudulent concealment with 
more particularity. To do so would require her to plead and 
-17-
prove that respondent somehow concealed from her view the 
whereabouts of the Chevron Station and/or prevented her from 
reading the very terms of the Lease which she claims was 
breached --a Lease which was a significant asset of the estate 
for which appellant served as executrix; a Lease appellant was 
at least generally aware of as early as 1958, and the rights to 
which she inherited from the original lessor, Pauline Koulis, 
in 1968. Simply to state the proof required is to expose the 
absurdity of appellant's argument of fraudulent concealment. 
There was no evidence brought forward by appellant even 
suggesting that respondent in any way tried to prevent her from 
obtaining a copy of the relevant Lease or in any way tried to 
prevent her from observing where the Chevron Station was 
constructed. Appellant concedes that respondent gave her a 
copy of the Lease as soon as she bothered to ask for one. 
Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated January 10, 1984, p.32. 
Indeed, it would have been next to impossible, if not 
impossible, for respondent to have tried to conceal the fact 
that approximately one-half of the Chevron Station was not 
constructed on the Koulis Property, because the appellant lived 
on the Koulis Property from the 1950's through 1967 and was 
familiar with property lines surrounding it. Deposition of 
Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, pp. 63-70; Deposition of 
Katherine Koulis dated January 10, 1984, pp. 24, 30-32. 
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Finally, appellant cannot successfully plead and prove 
fraudulent concealment in the instant case because the 
undisputed facts, far from showing concealment, demonstrate as 
a matter of law that appellant should have discovered the 
existence of her cause of action through reasonable care and 
inquiry. This argument will be developed fully in that portion 
of this brief dealing with application of the statute of 
4 
limitations to appellant's claim for fraud. 
In Myers v. McDonald, supra, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 
1981), Justice Oaks of the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the 
important policy considerations supporting statutes of 
limitations generally. Quoting the United States Supreme 
Court, Justice Oaks emphasized that statutes of limitations 
"are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises 
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber 
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and 
witnesses have disappeared." Id. at 86. 
Certainly these off-quoted policy considerations apply 
to the present case and compel the conclusion that appellant's 
actions should be barred by the statute of limitations. 
Appellant claims that respondent breached a Lease entered into 
It is submitted that the rules concerning delayed 
discovery and reasonable inquiry are the same for contract 
actions as they are for fraud actions. 
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in 1958. Fifteen years have passed since 1968, the time of the 
alleged breach. During that time, not only have witnesses 
forgotten the circumstances surrounding the terms of the Lease 
and the building of the Chevron Station, but key witnesses with 
respect to the terms of the Lease, Pauline Koulis and her son, 
Paul Koulis, have died. 
The present dispute is a prime example of a situation 
where the statute of limitations should be applied to protect 
respondent from the assertion of stale claims. 
2. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY BASED UPON THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WHERE THE FRAUD ALLEGED BY 
APPELLANT OCCURRED IN 1968 AND SUIT WAS NOT 
INSTITUTED UNTIL 1983 AND APPELLANT FAILED TO 
PRESENT A LEGALLY COGNIZABLE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY 
Under Utah law, actions based on allegations of fraud 
or mistake are subject to a three year statute of limitations. 
Section 78-12-26(3) of Utah Code states that a suit must be 
brought within three years for M[a]n action for relief on the 
ground of fraud or mistake; but the cause of action in such 
case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by 
the aggrieved party of the fraud or mistake." 
The Utah Supreme Court, however,, has qualified the 
language of §78-12-26(3) by declaring that the three year 
limitations period begins to run either from the time the 
plaintiff discovers the fraud, or from the time the plaintiff 
reasonably should have known of the fraud. McConkie v. 
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Hartman, supra, 529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974) (holding plaintiff's 
action time-barred under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) because 
eight years had elapsed in which time reasonable inquiry by the 
plaintiff would have put him on notice of the alleged mistake 
or fraud); Gibson v. Jensen, 48 U. 244, 158 P. 426, 427 
(1916) (one informed of such facts as will put a person of 
ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry has received 
information sufficient to start the running of the statute of 
limitations); Larsen v. Utah Loan & Trust Co., 65 P. 208, 211 
(Utah 1901) (the statute of limitations for fraud commences to 
run upon discovery of the fraud, or of facts sufficient to put 
an ordinarily intelligent person on inquiry); Taylor v. Moore, 
51 P.2d 222, 228 (Utah 1935) ("A party who has opportunity of 
knowing the facts constituting the alleged fraud cannot be 
inactive and afterwards allege a want of knowledge that arose 
by his own laches and negligence.") 
In McConkie v. Hartman, 529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974) the 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's application of 
UCA § 78-12-26(3) to bar plaintiffs' claims for fraud, in spite 
of plaintiffs' contention that there had been fraudulent 
concealment. The court refused to reform plaintiffs' warranty 
deeds to strike out certain reservations of mineral rights 
because plaintiffs had ample opportunity to discover any fraud 
or mistake by familiarizing themselves with the language of the 
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deeds. The court was unsympathetic to the fact that plaintiffs 
had not seen the deeds after their recordation. At page 802 
the court explained: 
It is the plaintiffs' claim here as well as 
in the court below that there was a fraudulent 
concealment on the part of the defendants which 
postponed the commencement of the running of the 
statute pursuant to the provisions of Section 
78-12-26(3) . . . . 
The court below found that the plaintiffs 
had full opportunity to discover the reservations 
in the deeds when the deeds were delivered to 
Security Title Company and when they reviewed 
problems in the chain of title. That all of the 
circumstances existing at or about the time the 
deeds were recorded were such as to furnish full 
opportunity to the plaintiffs for the discovery 
of the mistake or fraud, if any existed. The 
court further found that more than eight years 
had elapsed since the time for reasonable inquiry 
on the part the plaintiffs would have revealed 
the mistake or fraud to the time of filing their 
complaint. 
In McConkie, plaintiffs' action was barred because of 
their unreasonable failure for some 8 years to apprise 
themselves of certain deed provisions. In the present case, 
appellant's action should likewise be barred because of her 
unreasonable failure for some 15 years to apprise herself of 
certain Lease provisions. 
Both state and federal courts have not hesitated to 
determine the due diligence issue as a miatter of law when, as 
here, the circumstances clearly warranted it. Thus, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Gibson v. Jensen, supra, 158 P. 426, 428 
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(Utah 1916) reversed a lower court judgment for the plaintiff, 
holding as a matter of law that "plaintiff possessed all the 
information required by our statute respecting the alleged 
fraud more than three years preceding the bringing of the 
action." 
In Heifer v. Hubert, 24 Cal. Rptr. 900 (District 
Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California 1962) 
the court held that purchasers of a residence were barred from 
bringing an action for fraud on grounds that the vendors had 
falsely represented that the property had proper drainage, 
because the action was brought more than three years after the 
plaintiffs knew of the alleged fraud or had knowledge of facts 
sufficient to put a prudent man on inquiry. The court held: 
[W]hen the knowledge had by or imputed to 
plaintiff is such as to compel the conclusion 
that a prudent man would have suspected the 
fraud, the court may determine as a matter of law 
that there has been "discovery." Bainbridge v. 
Stoner, 16 Cal. 2d, 423, 430, 106 P.2d 423; Lady 
Washington C. Co. v. Wood, 113 Cal. 482, 486, 45 
P. 809; Haley v. Santa Fe Imp. Co., 5 Cal. 
App. 2d 415, 42 P.2d 1078. 
24 Cal. Rptr. 900, 902 (emphasis added); Accord, Beresford v. 
Horn 273 P.2d 302 (District Court of Appeal, Second District, 
Division 3, California 1954) (summary judgment against 
plaintiffs who had purchased and lived in a dwelling house 
which failed in obvious particulars to meet the requirements of 
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local building ordinances and who were unreasonable as a matter 
of law in failing to discover the nonconformance during their 
first thirteen months of occupancy); Wise v. Anderson, 359 
S.W. 2d 876, 879 (Tex. 1962) (as a matter of law 
plaintiff-lessor's action was barred by statute of limitations 
because plaintiff had "knowledge of facts that would cause 
reasonably prudent person to make inquiry which would lead to a 
discovery of the fraud."); Polk Terrace, Inc. v. Curtis, 422 
S.W. 2d 603, 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) ("As a matter of law in 
the light of their own testimony, appellees for more than two 
years prior to the institution of their suit on October 1, 1965 
had knowledge of such facts as would cause a reasonably prudent 
person to make inquiry which would have led to a discovery of 
the fraud."); Mason v. Laramie Rivers Co., 490 P.2d 1062, 
1065 (Wyo. 1971) (granting summary judgment to defendant 
corporation on grounds that plaintiff shareholders' fraud 
action was barred by the statute of limitations; the corporate 
books and records contained information which would have 
apprised plaintiffs of the fraud if only plaintiffs had 
exercised due diligence and checked the corporate records). 
So, too, the District Court for the Eastern District 
of Wisconsin, in Cahill v. Ernst & Ernst 448 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. 
Wisconsin 1978) affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor 
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of the defendant as to plaintiff's claims of fraud under the 
federal securities laws. Although the applicable statute of 
limitations in that case was a provision from Wisconsin's Blue 
Sky Laws, the court analogized to Wisconsin's statute of 
limitations for general fraud actions which, like the Utah 
statute at issue in the present case, provides that "the cause 
of action in [a fraud] case is not deemed to have accrued until 
discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting 
the fraud." The court quoted with approval the following 
language of a previous Wisconsin case, Koehler v. Haechler, 27 
Wis.2d, 275, 278, 133 N.W.2d 730, 731 (1965): 
Actual and complete knowledge of the fraud 
on the part of the plaintiff is not necessary in 
order to set the limitation period running. 
"When the information brought home to the 
aggrieved party is such as to indicate where the 
facts constituting the fraud can be effectually 
discovered on diligent inquiry, it is the duty of 
such party to make the inquiry, and if he fails 
to do so within a reasonable time, he is, 
nevertheless, chargeable with notice of all facts 
to which such inquiry might have lead." [0'Dell 
v. Bumham, 61 Wis. 562, 21 N.W. 635 (1884)]. 
Commenting on the above passage, the court 
stated in 1961: "Under the rule quoted above, it 
is not necessary that a defrauded party have 
knowledge of the ultimate fact of fraud. What is 
required is that it be in possession of such 
essential facts as will, if diligently 
investigated, disclose the fraud. The burden of 
diligent inquiry is upon the defrauded party as 
soon as he has such information as indicates 
where the facts constituting the fraud can be 
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discovered." [Milwaukee Western Bank v. 
Lienemann, 15 Wis. 2d 61, 112 N.W.2d 190 (1961)]. 
448 F. Supp. 84, 88. Cahill is just one example among an 
impressive number of federal fraud cases which were decided for 
the defendant on summary judgment due to plaintiff's 
unwarranted delay in bringing suit. In all such cases, the 
statute of limitations at issue (Section 13 of the Securities 
Act of 1933) prescribed a period of "one year after the 
discovery of the untrue statement or omission, or after such 
discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence. See Kramas v. Security Gas and Oil, Inc., 672 
F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1982); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 542 
F.2d at 917 (reasonable diligence is tested by an objective 
standard); Holtzman v. Proctor, Cook & Co., 1981-82 Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. U 98,421 (D.Mass. 1981); First Federal Savings and Loan 
Association of Miami v. Mortgage Corporation of the South, 650 
F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1981) Militsky v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. [CCH 1982 Transfer Binder] H 
98,859 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Sleeper v. Kidder, Peabody and Co., 
Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1264, 1269 (D.Mass. 1979). 
As the foregoing review of authorities readily 
demonstrates, where limitations hinges on the exercise of 
reasonable diligence by the plaintiff, the issue of his 
diligence may be disposed of as a matter of law. This is only 
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proper, since statutes of limitation are statutes of repose, 
and they require a plaintiff to act with specified promptness 
when he is in possession of sufficient facts to be put on 
inquiry of his potential claim. The statutory period "[does] 
not await [a plaintiff's] leisurely discovery of the full 
details of the alleged scheme." Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 
996 (7th Cir. 1974), quoted with approval in OfHara v. Kovens, 
473 F. Supp. 1161, 1166 (D.Md. 1979), aff?d 625 F.2d 15 (4th 
Cir. 1980), cert, denied 449 U.S. 1124 (1981). 
The present lawsuit was filed in August, 1983. To 
avoid the bar of the statute of limitations, appellant must not 
have, or reasonably should not have, discovered the alleged 
fraud before August, 1980. Excerpts from appellant's 
deposition and the general factual circumstances of this case 
demonstrate she knew or should have known of the facts giving 
rise to her complaint long before that date. Appellant was the 
executrix of the estate of Pauline Koulis, her predecessor in 
interest to the Lease. By her own admission, in 1968 she was 
aware that the Lease was among the assets of the Estate of 
Pauline Koulis. Notwithstanding this knowledge, she failed to 
acquaint herself with the terms of the 1958 Lease or 1967 
Modification. Appellant makes no allegation that respondent in 
any way prevented her from discovering the terms of the Lease. 
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Most significantly, as early as 1968 appellant was 
aware of facts sufficient to put her on notice of any breach of 
the Lease due to the fact that the Chevron Station was not 
constructed entirely upon the Koulis Property. In this respect 
the present case is similar to Taylor v. Moore, supra, 51 
P.2d 222 (Utah 1935). Taylor was a mortgage foreclosure suit 
in which the defendant mortgagor argued for rescission of the 
notes and mortgage on the ground that the vendor had 
fraudulently misrepresented that the mortgaged property 
included land upon which certain hotel and ranch buildings 
stood and also that title to the land constituted ownership of 
water supplied from a tank on adjoining property. The Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held that the facts 
were sufficient to give notice to mortgagor three years prior 
to commencement of the action that the buildings were located 
on property owned by a railroad, not on the mortgagor's 
property, and that the water was also owned by the railroad. 
These findings precluded rescission of the notes and mortgage. 
The court explained: 
If he had at the time he entered into the 
contract of purchase been lulled into security by 
the representation of Nephi M. Taylor respecting 
ownership of a good water right, surely he was 
then, in 1926, on notice of facts which he could 
not further ignore. The physical facts speak 
louder than any representation which Taylor could 
have made, that the hotel was on railroad 
property, and also that the water from the water 
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tank was owned by the railroad company. Gibson 
v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P. 426. The means 
of knowledge is equivalent to knowledge. A 
party who has opportunity of knowing the facts 
constituting the alleged fraud cannot be 
inactive and afterwards allege a want of 
knowledge that arose by reason of his own laches 
and negligence. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
Inv. Co., 43 Utah 181, 134 P. 603. 
51 P.2d 222, 228-9 (emphasis added). 
In the case at bar appellant admitted that at least 
once during 1968 she personally observed the Chevron Station, 
where it was built, and that the Chevron Station was entirely 
completed. Notwithstanding this admission, and notwithstanding 
the fact that appellant prior to 1968 lived on the Koulis 
Property for over ten years and was therefore familiar with its 
boundaries, she now asserts that she did not realize that the 
Chevron Station was constructed beyond the boundaries of the 
Koulis Property until 1982. Such an oversight is incredible, 
and unreasonable, especially in light of the fact that the 
Chevron Station exceeded the boundaries of the Koulis Property 
to such an extent. Nearly one-half of the Chevron Station was 
constructed on property beyond the limits of the Koulis 
Property onto the Crowther-Martin property. Also, she admitted 
she was aware of the common boundary between the Koulis 
Property and the Crowther-Martin Property in 1967, which is 
exactly the point in time that the Chevron Station was being 
built. The Crowther Property line is the precise property line 
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over which the Chevron Station overlaps. See Deposition of 
Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, pp. 63-70; Exhibit 6A to 
Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated January 10, 1984; 
Appellant's husband and her mother-in-law, Pauline Koulis, 
predecessors in interest under the Lease, also knew of the 
Crowther Property line. See Deposition of Katherine Koulis 
dated June 15, 1984, p. 73. The Chevron Station was built on 
both the Koulis Property and the Crowther Property. Deposition 
of Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, pp. 73-74. 
Additionally, the evidence below was uncontradicted 
that in order to construct the station, it was necessary to 
raze the Crowther residence and pave both the Koulis Property 
and the Crowther Property. Thus, when in 1968 and thereafter, 
appellant saw the Chevron Station, she would be charged with 
the knowledge that the Crowther residence was missing. This 
fact alone placed a duty of reasonable inquiry upon appellant. 
Why, if the Station was to be completely on her property, was 
the Crowther Property now part of the paving for the Station, 
and what happened to the Crowther house? 
Neither the trial court or this tribunal are required 
to wear blinders when confronted with statements which are 
patently erroneous. Common sense may not be abandoned in order 
to find genuine triable issues of fact where none exist. 
Appellant asserts (though not by affidavit or other competent 
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evidence) that the encroachment of the Station onto the 
Crowther property could not be ascertained except by a survey. 
The trial court had no difficulty in dismissing, as without 
merit, such assertion. The court below was correct in its 
action. How could someone as familiar with the Koulis and 
Crowther Properties as appellant not realize that all of the 
Crowther Property was being utilized for service station 
purposes? The entirety of the Crowther Property was paved. 
The Crowther house was gone. One half of the Crowther property 
has service station facilities on it. To simply reiterate 
these facts demonstrate the fallaciousness of the contention. 
As stated in Taylor v. Moore 51 P.2d 222 at page 228: 
The means of knowledge is equivalent to knowledge. A 
party who has the opportunity of knowing the facts 
constituting the alleged fraud cannot be inactive and 
afterwards allege a want of knowledge that arose by 
reason of his own laches and negligence. 
Appellant had for fifteen years prior to instituting 
this action, the means of knowledge. She failed to read the 
Lease and failed to become aware of the obvious. She cannot 
now be heard to complain that she did not know. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth above, it is 
respectfully submitted that the judgment in this matter was 
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correctly decided and it is urged that the judgment of the 
trial court be affirmed in its entirety. 
Respectfully Submitted 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
By: 
Michael F. Richman 
James W. Stewart 
Attorneys for Respondents 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
2384R 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHERINE KOULIS (GORAS), 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF 
CALIFORNIA, WESTERN OPERATIONS, 
INC.; CHEVRON USA, INC.; 
CHEVRON OIL COMPANY dba STANDARD 
OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-6295 
(Judge Frederick) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for 
hearing on Defendants' written Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Plaintiff's written Motion for Summary Judgment, before the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, District Judge, on the 6th day 
of August, 1984 at 10:00 a.m. The Plaintiff was represented by 
Mark S. Miner, Esq., and the Defendants were represented by 
Michael F. Richman, Esq., James W. Stewart, Esq. and Wayne D. 
Swan, Esq. 
EXHIBIT A 
Based upon the affidavits and exhibits submitted to 
the Court and upon the oral argument of the respective counsel, 
the Court finds that the Plaintiff had the opportunity of 
knowing the facts consitiuting the alleged fraud and was 
thereafter inactive and dilatory in commencing her action. The 
Court finds that all of the facts necessary for Plaintiff to 
have discovered the alleged fraud and commenced this action 
were available to her in 1968. The Court further finds that 
Plaintiff has failed to come forward with any legally 
cognizable reason to excuse her delayed discovery of the 
alleged fraud. 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted, and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is denied. Plaintiff's action is barred both by the 
statute of limitations for actions upon a contract (Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-26(2)) and by the statute of limitations 
applicable to actions for fraud (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-26(3)). 
The Court's determination herein is not based on 
Plaintiff's counsel's insertion of copies of the 1967 Grade 
Plans for the Chevron Station as Exhibits to the Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Affidavit of Katherine Koulis, and the Affidavit of Mr. Cayias. 
The Court having considered the written pleadings and 
oral arguments of counsel for all parties concerning the above 
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motions, the court being fully advised in the premises, and 
good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
(1) Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted; 
(2) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, 
(3) Defendants are awarded their costs herein. 
DATED this dav of/yyk^i-^Jy! I~984. 
BY THE COURT: 
". Dennis Frederick, 
District Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Michael F. Richman 
Attorney for Defendants 
Mark S. Miner 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's 
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Motion for Summary Judgment, this / 0 day of 4v-v'--Ti , 
J 
1984, to the following: 
Mark S. Miner, Esq. 
Peter Flangas, Esq. 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
-i-
•J) / 
Received copy / / / / \ , h,'P*)\ / / I / y\f ^ , 
8065s 
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L E A S E 
Dated: August 2, 1958 
1. PAULINE KCUL1S, Lessor, hereby leases to STAND-
ARD OIL COK?ANY OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN OPERATIONS, INC., 
Lessee, the folloving described premises in the City of Salt 
Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, to vie: 
Commencing at the southwest corner of Lot Ut 
Block 63, Plat C, Salt Lake City Survey, and 
running thence east 123.75 feet, thence north 
74.75 feet, thence vest 123.75 feet, thence 
south 74.75 feet, to the point of beginning. 
2. The term of this lease shall commence on October 
1, 195S, and end fifteen years after the first day of the first 
calendar month folloving the month during vhich a service sta-
tion is completely constructed on the leased premises, and 
all fixtures and equipment are installed thereon by Lessee. 
Provided, however, that in no event shall said fifteen-year 
period commence on a date later than June 1, 1959. 
3. Lessee agrees to pay Lessor rental for the use 
and occupancy of the leased premises as follows: 
(a) An interim rental of Tvo Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($250.00), payable in advance on the first day of each 
and every calendar month commencing October 1, 1955, 
and ending with the rental paid on the first day of the 
calendar month preceding the commencement date of the 
fifteen-year period provided in paragraph 2 hereof. 
(b) Thereafter, a regular rental in advance on 
the first day of each and every month during said 
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EXHIBIT B 
fifteen-year period the sum <cf Three Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($350.00). Provided, however, that no rental 
shall be due and payable hereunder until the date on 
which the leased premises are delivered to the lessee 
free and clear of all leases, liens, and encumbrances, 
except the lien of taxes and assessments for the cur-
rent year. 
4. Lessee shall have the right to remove from the 
leased premises all buildings and.improvements located thereon, 
and shall be entitled to all salvable material, except two 
sinks located in the upstair apartment. 
5. Lessee expects to commence construction of a 
service station on the leased premises within thirty (30) 
days after possession of the leased premises is delivered 
to the Lessee as provided in paragraph 3, or after issuance 
of all necessary permits and other authorizations, whichever 
is later. If Lessee shall be unable to obtain such permits 
and authorizations, Lessee may terminate this lease by giving 
Lessor ten days written notice of Lessee's intention so to do, 
provided, however, Lessee shall not tear dowTi or remove any 
buildings or improvements on the leased premises belonging 
to the Lessor until the permits and authorizations referred 
to in this paragraph are obtained. 
6. Lessee shall have the right during its occu-
pancy of the leased premises to use such premises for the 
primary purpose of conducting thereon a service station bus-
iness and for any other lawful business that will not mater-
ially interfere with said primary use. Lessee shall further 
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have *ight during its occupancy to construct and main-
tain on the leased premises such buildings, structures, im-
provements or equipment as Lessee may desire, and to cut 
curbs, construct roadways and use sidewalks for vehicles to 
pass to and from the leased premises. Upon the expiration 
of this lease, or any extension or renewal thereof, Lessee 
agrees to replace all curbs and sidewalks cut or removed by 
Lessee during the Lessee's occupancy of the premises. If it 
is or becomes unlawful for Lessee or anyone holding under 
Lessee directly or indirectly, to conduct a service station 
business, or to erect or maintain service station facilities 
on the leased premises, or if any part of the leased premises 
or the approaches thereto are condemned or changed by public 
authority, so that in any such case enumerated above it be-
comes impossible or impracticable to use the leased premises 
for service station purposes> then Lessee shall have the right 
at any time thereafter to terminate this lease by giving Lessor 
ten days notice in writing of such termination. 
7. Except as provided in paragraph 11 hereof, 
Lessee shall have the right at any time during Lessee's 
occupancy of the leased premises, or within a reasonable 
time thereafter, to remove any and all buildings, improve-
ments, fixtures and equipment owned or placed by Lessee, 
Standard Oil Company of California, or the sublessees or 
licensees of either, in, under or upon the leased premises, 
or acquired by Lessee whether before or during the term 
thereof, but Lessee shall not be obliged to do so. 
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8, Lessee shall pay all taxes levied or assessed 
during the term of this lease on any facilities located on 
the leased premises while such facilities are owned by Lessee. 
All other real or personal property taxes or assessments, in-
cluding all street improvements or other special taxes or 
assessments, shall be paid by Lessor. If Lessor fails to 
pay its share of taxes set forth in this paragraph promptly 
when due, or fails to perform promptly any obligation cving 
to a third person, which, if unperformed, might result in 
termination of this lease, including any obligation to a 
third person secured by a lien on the leased premises, Lessee 
may pay such taxes or perform such obligation for the account 
of Lessor and bill Lessor for the cost thereof, or deduct such 
cost from rentals accruing under this lease. 
9. Lessee, while in possession, shall have the 
prior right (1) to buy the whole or any part of the leased 
premises or any larger parcel which includes the leased prem-
ises, if Lessor receives from a third party an acceptable 
bona fide offer to buy, or if Lessor offers to sell, such 
property, and (2) to lease the whole or any part of the 
leased premises or any l^iger parcel which includes the 
leased p"\':Lses, if Lessor receives from a third party an 
acceptable bona fide offer, or if Lessor offers, to lease 
such property for a term commencing on or after the expira-
tion of the term hereof, or any extension thereof. In either 
such event, Lessor shall forthwith give Lessee written notice 
of such offer, together with a copy thereof, and Lessee shall 
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have sixty days from the receipt of such notice to buy or to 
lease such property, as the case may be, at the terms of such 
offer, or at such lesser terras as Lessor and Lessee may agree 
upon. If Lessee fails to exercise such option within such 
sixty days, Lessor shall have sixty days thereafter within 
which to sell or to lease, as the case-may. be,—such, property 
to the party and upon the terms stated in the notice to Lessee 
without resubmitting such offer to Lessee as hereinabove 
provided. If Lessor sells such property to a third person, 
such sale shall be cade subject to the terms and provisions 
of this lease, including but without limiting the generality 
of the foregoing, the provisions of this paragraph. 
10. If Lessee shall hold over after the expiration 
of the tens of this lease, or any extension thereof, such 
tenancy shall be from month to month only and upon all the 
terms, covenants and conditions hereof. 
11. Lessee may terminate this lease at anytime 
after completion of construction of a service station thereon 
by giving Lessor thirty days prior written notice of intention 
<o to do. Provided, however, Lessee executes and delivers to 
the Lessor a bill of sale covering the service station build-
ing then located on the leased premises. Lessee agrees that 
the service station then on the leased premises shall be of 
modern design and in good operating condition and state of 
repair. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as re-
quiring the Lessee to give the Lessor a bill of sale covering 
the service station building if the lease is terminated by 
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by the Lessee pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs 5 c 
u 'hereof. 
12. Lessee agrees to reimburse Lessor for all 
taxes in excess of One Hundred Eighty Dollars ($180.00) per 
year levied against the real estate covered by this lease. 
Special assessments levied against such real estate shall 
not be considered in determining such excess. 
13. Lessee may extend this lease upon all of the 
terms and provisions hereof for a further period of five 
years by giving Lessor notice in writing of Lessee's inten-
tion so to do at any time prior to the expiration of the term 
hereof. 
14. In the event Lessee exercises the option to 
extend this lease as provided in paragraph 13, it shall have 
the further option to extend this lease for a further period 
of five years by giving Lessor notice in writing of Lessee's 
intention so to do at any time prior to the expiration of the 
term provided in paragraph 13. The extension provided for in 
this paragraph shall be upon all of the terms and conditions 
of the lease, except that the rental shall be reasonable in 
view of business conditions then prevailing, but not less 
than $375.00 per month% nor more than $^50.00 per moa — 
15. No failure to perform any condition or coven-
ant of this lease shall entitle Lessor to terminate this lease 
unless said failure shall have continued for fifteen days 
after notice in writing requiring the performance of such 
condition or covenant shall have been given to Lessee. 
-6-
16. All rentals payable hereunder shall be paid 
to Pauline Koulis unless and until Lessor designates some 
other party to receive rentals. 
17. Written notices to Lessor hereunder shall, un-
til further notice by Lessor, be addressed to Lessor at 2370 
Bryan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Written notices to Lessee hereunder shall, until 
further notice by or on behalf of Lessee, be addressed to 
Lessee at 164 South Vest Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
All notices shall be delivered personally or de-
posited in the United States Post Office, properly addressed 
as aforesaid, postage fully prepaid, for delivery by regis-
tered mail. 
18. Execution of this lease by Lessor constitutes 
an offer which shall not be deeded accepted by Lessee until 
Lessee has executed this lease and delivered a duplicate 
original thereof to Lessor. 
19. The provisions of this lease shall inure to 
the benefit of Lessee and of its principal, Standard Oil 
Company of California. This lease shall bind and also inure 
to the benefit of the successors and assigns of Lessee, and 
shall bind and inure to the benefit of the heirs, adminis-
trators, executors, successors and assigns of Lessor. Lessee 
may assign this lease or sublease the leased premises, or 
any part thereof, provided that no such act on the part of 
the Lessee shall operate to relieve it of any of its obliga-
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(LUIS I ' l l l l r n l l i r r , dated the 2 n d day of A u g U S t 19.58.. 
by and between *.*k:- . .^yJ-IS _ _ 
•of S a l t . .Lake.. C..tty.....y.t.ah, _ , 
hereinafter called "Lessor," and S T A N D A R D O I L C O M P A N Y O F C A L I F O R N I A , W E S T E R N O P E R A -
T I O N S , INC., hereinafter called "Lessee," 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
That for the term and upon the terms and conditions Kt forth in that certain written lease agreement, bearing date 
A U g U f l t . . . Z . , 19. J O . , from Lessor to Leasee, all of which terms and conditions arc hereby made a part 
hereof, as fully and completely as if herein specifically set out in full, Lessor has leased, demised and let, and docs hereby 
lease, demise ajid let, unto Leasee, the following described real property, situate, lying a-nd t*ing In the G t y of 
S a l * . L a k e _ County. Precinct or Island of S a l t . l a k e . _ . . _ 
State or Territory of .V.t.af\ more particularly described as follows, to-wit: 
Commencing at the southwest corner of Lot 4, 
Block 63, Plat C, Salt Lake City Survey, and 
running thence east 123.75 feet, thence north 
74.75 feet, the nee west 123.75 feet, thence 
south 74.75 feet, to the point of beginning. 
City and County of S. 
On this 
Francisco) 
day of t< 19-'"/ before me pe 
sonally appeared H. D. Rasrr.ussen, to me personally known, who by me 
being duly sworn did say that he Is attorney In fact of Standard Oil 
Company of California, Western Operations, Inc., duly appointed under 
resolution Its Board 01 directors dated the 2C'c\> Nov V * ~ 
1958, which said resolution is now in full force and effect, and that 
the foregoing instrument was executed in the name and behalf of said 
Standard Oil Company oT California, Western Operations, Inc., by said 
H. D. Rasmussen as its attorney In fact, and said H. D. Rasmussen ac-
knowledged said instrument to be the free act and deed of Standard Oil 
Company of California, Western Operations, Inc. 
. • ' " • - • " .'. " • ' * ' • ' * • . ' * • • . 
IN WITNESS' VKZREQF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my 
Official Seaiv/at myv.cfflce in the City and County of San Francisco, 
the day anc] ye'^r^ iiv tb'Js certificate first above written. 
(Other than Cali'JT 
•and Hawaii) 
Notary/Public in" and for the City anc County 
of SarT Francisco, State of' Calif ornla 
My commission expires * / ? 
jp^r^7£r£5^££&£!I 
0° t h i s / / ^ay °f August, 1958, personal ly appeared before 
n€ a Notary Pub l i c , PAULIKE KOULIS, - sigrj^r^of the f o r e g o i w ^ i n s cru-
icent, who duly acknowledged to ne t h ^ t ^ ^ ^ x e c u t e d t h e ^ * s * ^ 
My Cocrrission Expires: 
C7— ^ = * 7 tr~l 
"U 
Notary Public 
Residing at .S^lt Lake C i t y , Utah 
m. 
FEB 191959
 u ^ J , 
Fee Paid. Ne'j£ M. Jack, 
Recorder, Ssl^CTW County. UUh 
'J.T'c"'~/o. 
INDENTURE 
<Pr. LC^U. 
Acknowledge here) 
Letsor 
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, 
WESTERN OPERATIONS, INC, 
Lessee 
~ATtvryi ryirrF JSTT~ 
>TATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) SB 
On t h i s / f day of A u g u s t , 1 9 5 8 , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r * 
a N o t a r y Pub 1 lib, PAULINE KOULIS , • s i g n e C ^ o f t h e f o r e g o i : 
red b e f o r e 
~ -
 0 _ i M ^ i p s t r u -
i s e n t , v h o d u l y a c k n o w l e d g e d t o sae t h a t < ^ K V / e R e p u t e d t h e ^ a ? i e \ 
Hy£~ozraLssion Empires : 
J^ ^L<7 
^f^. Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
m. 
FEB 191959 
Recorded a t "-,-^ 
Request of a t M ^ X J - ^ 
Fee Paid NeU£ M. Jack, 
Recorder, S^U-Cgg County. UtAh 
R.f. ^M-^^ffi^y^r,*. ui. 
INDENTURE 
MODIFICATION OF LEASE 
This Modification of Lease agreement, dated May 16, 
1967, by and between PAULINE KOULIS , Lessor, and CHEVRON OIL 
COMPANY, a corporation, doing business as STANDARD OIL COMPANY 
OF CALIFORNIA, successor in interest of STANDARD OIL COMPANY 
OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN OPERATIONS, INC., Lessee, 
WITNESSETH: 
In consideration of the sua of One Hundred Dollars 
($100.00), paid to Lessor by Lessee, receipt of which is here-
by acknowledged, and in consideration of the mutual covenants of 
the parties hereto, it is agreed that the Lease, dazed August 2, 
1958, wherein the Lessor leased to the Lessee the following 
described premises in the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, to-wit: 
Commencing at the Southwest corner of Lot 4, 3lock 63, 
Plat "C" , Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence 
East 123.75 feet, thence North 74.75 feet, thence 
West 123.75 feet, thence South 74.75 feet, to the 
point of beginning, 
shall be and the same is hereby modified as follows: 
1. The fifteen year tern provided for in paragraph 2 
of the Lease shall commence on the date Lessee has completed 
construction of the service station on the leased premises, but 
not later than November 1, 1967, and shall end fifteen years 
thereafter, but not later than October 31, 1982. 
2. The provisions of paragraph 12 of the Lease shall be 
amended as follows: 
EXHIBIT C 
12. Lessee agrees to pay the taxes levi^ vl oi 
assessed against the leased precises after the year 1967 and 
during the remainder of the terra of the Lease. Taxes for the 
year 1967 are to be prorated as of June 1st. 
3. Lessee indennifies Lessor and agrees to hold her 
harmless froa and against all claims, demands and causes of 
action on account of personal injury to or death of any person 
or on account of dacage or injury to property resulting froa 
the use or occupancy of the leased precises or any of the acts 
or conduct of the Lessee in the operation of its business upon 
the said precises. 
4. The interic rental provided for in paragraph 3 (a) 
of the Lease shall cogence as of June 1st, 1967, and end upon 
cocpletion of construction of the service station on the leased 
precises by Lessee, but not later than October 31, 1967. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this 
agreecent in triplicate. 
j.::.Cj±jL22t -
mj/i tt*-H-1////: 
•V • L - ' LESSOR 
CHEVRON OIL COMPANY 
d /b / a STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 
- ' B y ^ . cf. 
LESSE: 
STATE 6?~VTXX~ ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this
 r? fa day of 
before me, a Notary Public, PAOLINE KOULIS, signer of the foregoing 
instrument, vho acknowledged^to oe that•she*executed the saae. 
a ^ 1 9 6 7 , personally appeared 
'&&>^r^ 
My ^ Coooission Expires: 
Notary Public L 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
1/ C/^S^^SSMi 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this j2 day of Cjk/>£^ , 1967, personally appeared 
before oe ^/s. r/. * Jss.~.*^ s?,/^ // , who bejmg by ne duly sworn 
did say that he is the /9^<^J^, ^>^^r ^JifJs,* s?£*»,sot CHEVRON 
OIL COMPANY, doing business as STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, 
and that said ins truiaent was signed^in behalf of said corporation 
by authority and said \J^'.
 yy A J^S^^-^^S^ acknowledged to 
ne that the corporation executed the sane. 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Cocsission Expires: 
I/' 
-3-
i . QULNYII: CANNON 
A:tJrr.cy at Lav; 
619 Continental Dank 31dg 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
32S-3?S9 
iL^D iN CLEPJVO C.-rlCE 
-:i.. L- rj Cc*j".y Utr.n 
JUL 101953 
w . :•:.-, 
c s^ s^fe/f.". '2ZSl^^\ 
L\\">ct;' C:*.-:< 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
tne Matte: ; t a t e c: 
PAULINE RADUuJ KCULI' 
) APPROVAL OF FIRST AND FINAL 
ACCOUNT, DECREE OF DISTRI3U-
) TIGN AND DISCHARGE OF EXECUTORS 
Deceasec. ) 
y f z 3D 
^ a t e 
f V ^ ' l k'n-i"! i I moults anc .\c.:p.ev:r;e \cuiis, execu-
tors Psvl-nr-* C w i Raculj Koulis, cecccScd, for Approval 
u^e r ^  I o Z .-.ceojnt, Decree o f T> • c -ribution, and Dis-
cnorec Executors having cor.e on regularlv for hearing on the 
3rd day of July, 19 53, befo V £ ^ r>" • c* " ^  (O - K bove en. tit lee cot ar.c i! 
appearing that the sale Pauline Radulj K o u l i s , also knov.-n as Pauline 
Koulis, was b e m or the 2-lth day of July, 1890, at Elate, Province 
of Sac' Croatia, ncv: Yugoslavia, and she v;as the v:idcu of the late 
George J. Koulis , and said Pauline Koulis died on the 2Cth day cz 
January, 19cS, at Salt Lake City, County oi: Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
and at the civ.a of her death and for -any years prior thereto she nai 
an actual and bona fide res:den: of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
and left an estate in said Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
That petitioners, Paul Koulis and Katherine Koulis, were 
duly appointed, qualified and acted as executors of said estate; and 
sa?d executors duly v. ace and filed v>ith the above entitled court ^n 
inventory of all property that said dwCtas^d possessed and all Pro-
perty tr.«r s f erred u'i chir. three years of their deaths, and said 
properties u:rc appraised by the court appraisers in the sun of 
SI 1, & 0 5 . 2 S an J ike St a t e T ax C o.ui s s i on appraiser appraised s a i cJ 
,-rcxj; .;ric > in tin:- sun of £ O S , 6 S J . ^ 5 ^nd there v;as an increase in 
EXHIBIT D 
Thar said executors caused Notice to Creditors to be 
published in the Salt Lake Times, said Notice to Creditors was 
published in the manner and for the period of time required by 
lav; and thereafter the court made and entered its order decreeing 
that cue and legal notice to creditors had been given and that the 
time for presentation of claims had expired. 
That no formal claims were filed v;ith said executors 
as required by lav. and all claims against said estate, all expenses 
of the last illness cf said deceased3 all funeral expenses have 
been paid and satisfied and the State Inheritance Tax in the sum 
of $529.40 has been paid in full; that a Federal and State Tax 
return was filed v:ith the director of Internal Revenue and in that 
said estate did net exceed $60,000.00, there was no federal 
estate tax due and owing. 
That en the 21st day cf December, 1967, said Pauline 
Radulj Koulis made and executed her Last V:ill and Testament and 
at said time she was not acting under any fraud, menace, duress, or 
undue influence of any kind and was of sound mind and disposing 
memory; and said Last Will and Testament was duly and properly 
admitted to probate as the Last Will and Testament of said deceased. 
That said Last Will and Testament of Pauline Radulj Koulis 
deceased, provided: 
"In the event m,y beloved son, Paul Koulis and his beloved 
wife, Kathe irir.c: G. Koulis shall survive me, I hereby civise 
and beoue^lh to thtv as joint to.vnts or to the survivor 
in the event one shall predecta-: mo, all my property, 
real, personal and mixed of which I may possess at the 
time of my death of every kind, nature and description 
wheresoever situated.M 
That said Paul Koulis and his wife, Katherine G. Koulis, 
•rvi >;e Pauline R^.culj Koulis and are acting as executors of said 
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estate and arc the sole beneficiaries under said Last V.'ill and 
Testament. 
That a.T.ong the assets of said estate are the following 
pieces of real property in the County of Salt lake, State of Utah 
to-wit: 
^ r,-P'^t v Corner of Li^nth .'est anc : nr* V-.-r-h . £r..pic , iuit L.aiw& 
City, Utah, subject to lease to Stardard Cil Ccr-
pany of California for 15 years at $350.00 per 
month, more particularly described as follov/s: 
corner of Lot 4, Block 63, Plat "C", Salt 
Lake City, Survey and running thence '..'est 2.5 
South 74.7 5 feet to the point cf beginning. 
tne boutn^v :crner cf Lot 4, 
v > ^ « ' ~\ n i ^ Moll ^ T ^ T I <•* • _ c ' 
i*o:f; c3, Plat C , Salt La.-.c uity Survey, anc 
running thence East 5 rods, thence North 74. 75 
feet; thence south 74.75 feet, to the point of 
beginning. 
2370 Eryr.n Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah .rore par tic; 
described as follows: 
East 15 feet of Lot 22, and ail of Lot 23, and 
then L'est 20 feet of Lot 24, Block 1, Wasatch 
Heights. 
That trie nares and addresses of said beneficiaries *. 
saic i-as t i:: j _ a nd Testarent and the nar« :ciesses or a ^ : 
next of kin and heirs at l = -.;of said Pauline Radulj Koi 
r> a- A d d r e s s 
Paul Kodlis 
Kacharire C. Kcuiis 
Daughter-in-lav 
Dr..-c:-'r •>. iow-.lis 
Adopted cv.uchlcr 
josie IM: .:J j s 
Adopted dr.j^hLcu* 
2^70 Bryan Avenge Over 21 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
2270 L.y_.. A., :: cc- C.cr 21 
Salt Lake City, Vzch 
2370 Ziy.:\ Avenue January l-l 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
2370 b-i.yr.-i Avenue Cctcbei 4, 
Salt Lake Ci ly, Utah 
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That said executors have computed av statutory fee and 
and commission as provided by law in Section 75-11-25 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, for executors, which fee is in the sum of 51,316.54 
and the fee for the attorney for said executors in the sum of $2,617.* 
which fee is computed in accordance with the Advisory Handbook of the 
Utah State Bar. 
That said executors desire that said estate be distributed 
as provided in said Last 'Jill and Testament of said Pauline Radulj 
.NOUIIS, ceceasec, ?s:0 -:n-l: vouiis anc \atnerme u. i^ culis as icmt 
tenants wno have run ngr.ts or survivorship. 
NOV.", THEREFORE, IT IS KEFuEBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AKD DECREE 
1. That the First and Final Account of the executors of 
the estate of Pauline Radulj Koulis, deceased, be and the same is 
hereby settled, allowed and approved. 
2. That in accordance with said Last V;ill and Testament 
the following described properties are hereby distributed to Paul 
Koulis and Katharine G. Koulis, his wife, as joint tenants and not 
as tenants in common with full rights of survivorship: 
Corner of Eighth 'Jest and North Temple, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, subject to lease to Standard Cil Com-
pany of California for 15 years at 5350.00 per 
month, more particularly described as fellows: 
Commencing 2.5 rods Uest from the Southeast 
corner of Lot 4, Block 63, Plat "C", Salt 
Lake City, Survey and running thence 'Jest 2.5 
rods, Korth ?';.7 5 feet; East 2.5 rods; thence 
South 74.75 fc-c.t to the point c: beginning. 
Commencing at the Southwest corner of Lot 4, 
HloL-k 63, Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and 
running thence East 5 rods, thence Morth 74.75 
feet; thence south 74.75 feet, to the point of 
beginning. 
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2370 Bryan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, irore particularly 
described as follows: 
Ess 15 feet of Lot 22, and all cf Lot 23, and 
then West 20 teen of Let 24, Block 1, Wasatch 
Heights. 
all cash, all personal property of said estate 
including the Pontiac Catalina, 1961 sedan, Serial 361 K 4042, 1967 
Utah license CJ4S05 and all household furnishings and personal effects, 
together v;ith all unknown property belonging to said estate which -".ay 
be hereafter discovered. 
Lose-tner w 
or s m tne sur/. or ^i} Jic . 3-
is allov;ed and approved and the clairr, of T. Quentin Cannon as attorney 
for said executors, in the sue of $2,617.45 is allowed and approved. 
4. That said administration of said estate is closed and 
:nat tnev nave 
received trcir in tere s t and the same is filed with the clerk of the 
above entitled court, and that said attorney's fees have been paic 
in full, said e:;ecutor$ are discharged ircr.: further a' 
:
 of Pauline Rnculj Koulis, deceased. 
civ.im strati on 
M s aic estate 
r, day of July, I96S 
EY THE COURT: 
; . •• 'ATTEST 
J U D G E 
S T * T £ OP U T A H i 
COCNTV c r J H T L A K E ( i : > 
I T H E C ' S C e r s i C C O . C L E * * OP T H £ OiSTrt tCT 
ZD'JPT OP J ' .LT L A K f COw'N'TV. U T A H DO H ' R I B V 
;
- y n " ' M i T T r . £ A N N E X E D A N D -.->"» CCr.'.C tS 
• "
:
"*- ^ '-'•& 1'wuL CO^v OK »N O ' - i G N * L DOCU. 
f NT o \ ' K i L ' i if: v v o r i f i c e * S S U C M C ' - C T . K 
— ^^o, . .f \ .J^A._ „4> 
c .er;€'J this Notice on he w.^in nan 
NOTICE OF BREACH OF LEASE ^ the J/Sih; 01 ^^ry^ZZl 
880 VEST NORTH TEMPLE, 19 JL^>
 2: >. :.i •-} , ^ •• . ! , 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 6 " " 'W '""' ° " * 
KOULIS TO STANDARD OIL 
COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 
3v W X 7 " A 
Standard Oil Company of California 
Western Operations Incorporated 
fc Service Agent 
C.T. Corporations Systems 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
In Re: Lease 880 West North 
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84116 — Koulis to Standard 
Oil Company of California 
The Standard Oil Company of California, Western Operations 
Incorporated is hereby given NOTICE that on August 2, 1958 they 
did enter into a lease agreement with Pauline Koulis; under 
the terms and conditions of the said lease, the Standard Oil 
Company of California did solemnly agree to build a service 
station and maintain the service station facilities on the 
property of Pauline Koulis. That in direct violation of the 
lease, Standard Oil Company of California did not build a 
service station on Lessee's land as made and provided in the 
lease agreement and by reason thereof they have violated the 
lease in its entirety. 
That as made and provided in paragraph fifteen (15) of 
said lease, the Standard Oil Company of California, Western 
Operations Incorporated is hereby given notice that said 
corporation does have fifteen (15) days after receipt of this 
notice to completely construct a service station on the lease 
premises of Pauline Koulis and Kathrine Koulis, more particularly 
described as follows: 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, commencing at the southwest corner of Lot 4, Block 63, 
Plat C, Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence east'123.75 
EXHIBIT E 
feet, thence north 74.75 feet, thence west 123.75 feet, thence 
south 74.75 feet, to the point of beginning. 
You are further given NOTICE that should you fail to comply 
with the lease and completely construct a service station on 
the lease premises, as made and provided in the August 2, 1958 
lease also referred to in the modification of the lease, dated 
June 26, 1967. That the present Lessor, Mrs. Katherine Koulis, 
will take appropriate action as is deemed to be required, to 
require you to carry out the terms and conditions of said lease. 
You will please govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this 30th day of December,1982 
MARK 
Attorney for Lessors 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
PLEASE SERVE: C.T. CORPORATIONS SYSTEMS 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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